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Gambling is defined as risking something of value upon the outcome of
a contest of chance or a future contingent event not under control of
the player. Advancement would include any type of conduct that
would establish, create or aid any form of gambling. Generally
"advancing" would include any activity that goes beyond being a
player. (2) Profiting from unlawful gambling. Profiting is the receipt of
money or other property other than as a player. These two terms en-
compass any form of exploitive gambling. The player is not penalized
as long as he does not receive any profit other than personal winnings.
The defense of being a player is controled by requiring the defendant
to raise the issue. This would mean that he would have to testify as to
the circumstances that resulted in his indictment.28
A statute of this nature would benefit Kentucky. The process of
framing an indictment would be simplified, which would increase the
efficiency of the law. It would allow people to engage in gambling
while preventing this activity from being exploited.
Shelby C. Kinkead, Jr.
GunINAL LAW-STOP Am FmsK-THE NmrE FOR LEGISLATIVE RE-
FonM.-A man walks slowly down a residential street at an extremely
late hour in an area where there have been numerous reports of
break-ins. Can a municipal or county police officer in the state of
Kentucky stop this person and require of him his name, his address,
and his purpose for being out so late? If the officer does not receive
satisfactory answers can he frisk the person? Under present Kentucky
law, he may not. At the present there is no codified law in Kentucky
governing the procedure known as "stop and frisk." There are no cases
directly in point, but there are some that set up guidelines for a police
officees actions in dealing with suspected offenders. These cases deal
with arrest and search without a warrant. They have variously held
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(a) Engaging in Bookmaling to the extent that he receives or ac-
cepts in any one day more than 5 bets totaling more than 500 dollars; or
(b) Receiving in connection with a Lottery or mutuel scheme or
enterprise (i) money or written records from a person other than a
player whose chances or plays are represented by such money or rec-
ords, or (ii) more than 500 dollars in any one day of money played
in the scheme or enterprise.
2.) Promoting gambling in the first degree is a class C felony.
The maximum sentence for a class C felony is 5 years and the maximum
fine is $2,500.2 8 MicH. REv. Cnmm. CODE § 6101; §§ 6115-20, Comment (1967).
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that where a crime is being committed in the presence of the officer
an arrest and search may be made without a warrant,' that incident
to a lawful arrest a right to search the person arises, 2 or that when a
person is rightfully arrested in his car, the car may be searched.3 A
pre-1900 Court in Kentucky went so far as to hold that mere
suspicion did not authorize a search.4 In recent times the Court has
been taking a somewhat more permissive viewpoint. In Boles v. Com-
monwealth,5 the Court held that the United States Constitution
guarantees security to a citizen from unreasonable searches and
seizures, but not against a search and seizure springing from the
rationality of stated facts molded into probable cause. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals went one step further in 1966 and held that the
constitutional guarantee which affords protection from an illegal
search does not prevent seizure without a search warrant where there
is no need for a search (i.e., where the objects sought are visible,
open, and obvious to anyone who is casually observing) .7 Therefore, by
implication, it appears that the courts in Kentucky have joined the
majority of the other states that do not have a "stop and frisk" law by
holding that there must be a lawful arrest connected with the search
before said search will be valid.
The Kentucky Crime Commission in its proposal for revising
Kentucky's criminal law, has not specifically commented upon a stop
and frisk law for Kentucky. It has instead been incorporated in
Section 3701-Arrest by Peace Officer-a subsection dealing with stop
and frisk.8 By some oversight, this section, in fact all of part IV, has
been omitted from the commentary and one must therefore rely on the
materials indicated in its index as the sources for the proposal. By
using this approach it appears that the Kentucky Crime Commission
is suggesting that the legislature consider a stop and frisk law much
like the one adopted by New York.9 This law states that an officer may
stop any person in a public place who he reasonably suspects is com-
mitting, has committed, or is about to commit a felony. He may de-
mand of that person his name, address, and an explanation of his
I United States v. Stafford, 296 F. 702 (E.D. Ky. 1923).
2 Turner v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 825, 231 S.W. 519 (1921).
3 Combs v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 794, 113 S.W.2d 438 (1938).
4 Hugh v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 497, 41 S.W. 294 (1897).
5304 Ky. 216, 200 S.W.2d 467 (1947).
6Id. at 217, 200 S.W.2d at 468.
tFoster v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 914 (1967).
8 KENTucKY CiuiFE COMM'N OUTLINE FoR PRoposED Cma~hINAL LAW RE-
VISION § 3701 (1968).
9 N.Y. CODE Cunm. Pnoc. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
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actions. The law further states that the officer may search the suspect
only if he reasonably feels that he is in danger of life and limb.",
The historical development of stop and frisk laws has been very
interesting. The English common law stated that a night watchman
in a village could stop an unfamiliar person on the street late at night
and detain him until morning, at which time he would be arrested if
a crime had been discovered or released if there were no further
grounds for detention.". In 1839, the English Parliament extended the
common law power to detain by authorizing the police to search any
vessel, carriage of person who could reasonably be suspected of
possessing stolen goods.12 A number of state courts have followed the
English common and statutory law, and in the absence of statutory
provisions have upheld the power of their police officers to stop,
question, and frisk suspects under reasonable circumstances. These
courts have found that the police have a duty to stop and question
suspects under circumstances which reasonably require investigation,
and to frisk incident to the inquiry.13 California is one of these states
which has by judicial decision enacted a stop and frisk law.14 The
California law is much broader than the New York law or the Delaware
law,'5 tvo of the statutory provisions that the Kentucky Crime Com-
mission uses as support for section 3701. The courts have construed
the New York law1 to permit frisking at any time there is a stop be-
cause of the risk and exposure involved for the officer (the answer to
his question might be a bullet).' 7 Even when the officer has his gun
10 Id.
11L. HAWEINs, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 28-29 (18th ed. 1824).
12 Stem, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to A Modern Problem, 58
J. Cnmi. L.C. N P.S. 532 (1967).
13See People v. Marks, 46 CaI.2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); People v.
Henneman, 261 ]1M. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937); State v. Cantrell, 210 S.W.2d
866 (Mo. 1958); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 144, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964); State
v. Chrenister, 853 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); City of Portland v. Good-
win, 187 Ore. 409, 427, 210 P.2d 577, 585 (1949); State v. Kilday, 155 A.2d
836 (R.I. 1959); State v. Zupan, 155 Wash. 80, 283 P. 671 (1929); State v.
Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932).
14 Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 P. 43 (1908). In this case the court
held that an officer has a right to make an inquiry, in a proper manner, of anyone
upon the public streets at a late hour as to his identity and the occasion of his
presence, if the surroundings are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that
the public safety requires such identification. Id. at 16-17, 98 P. at 45. The
courts went further in People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d. 448, 350 P.2d 658, 30
Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963) and said that if the circumstances warrant it, the officer in
self-protection, may submit the suspect to a superficial search.5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1901-1912 (1966). A peace officer may stop
any person whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed a crime.
A 1960 case, Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1960), has held that
this is a constitutional exercise of the police power.
16 N.Y. CODE Ciunm. Pnoc. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
17 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 144, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964).
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drawn, frisking is necessary on the grounds of elemental safety: the
tables are easily turned. 8 Clearly the New York law does not change
the grounds for an arrest or a full-blown search. This is still "probable
cause" as required by the fourth amendment of the Constitution. The
New York law and its interpretation establish reasonable suspicion as
the grounds for the stop and frisk. The reason for the different stan-
dards derives from the difference between stop-frisk and arrest-search
situations. The stop is a relatively short, inconspicuous, and less
humiliating event than an arrest, and the frisk is strictly limited to the
contact or superficial patting down of the outer clothing of the
suspect.19 This appears to be a reasonable interpretation, one that in
fact is made mandatory if the stop and frisk laws are not to run afoul
of the fourth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has recently validated two
states' stop and frisk laws. In Terry v. Ohio,20 the Court held that a
police officer may under appropriate circumstances and surroundings
approach and stop a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause to make
an arrest. It further held that any search for weapons must be strictly
accompanied by circumstances which justify its initiation and must
be limited to that which is necessary for discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.21 On the same day
that the Terry opinion was handed down, the Court upheld the New
York law in deciding jointly the cases of Sibron v. New York and
Peters v. New York.22 In Peters, the Court upheld the requirement that
some grounds to raise a suspicion or at least an inference of suspicion
be present before the stop can legally be made. In sustaining the lower
court's decision, the Court held that there must be some activity on
the part of a person to make him suspect and therefore give a reason
for the officer to stop him.23 The lower court's decision in Sibron was
18 Id.
'9 See, Note, Criminal Law-New York Authorizes Police to "Stop and
Frisk" on Reasonable Suspicion, 78 HAThv. L. REv. 478 (1964).
20 88 U.S. 1868 (1968).
21 In this case a police officer observed two men whom he had not seen in
the long time he was on that beat, walking back and forth peering into a store
window. They would, one at a time, pass by the store, then return to where the
other was waiting, confer briefly, then pass by the store again. A third man ap-
peared, but left shortly after conferring with the other two. After about a dozen
trips to the front of the store and back, the two departed. The officer followed
them and upon seeing them confer with the third man about four or five blocks
away, stopped them and asked what they were doing. Upon receiving un-
satisfactory answers, he proceeded to frisk the three. On two of them he found
concealed deadly weapons which led to their arrest. Id. at 1871-72.
22 Sibron v. New York, 88 U.S. 1889 (1968).
23 Id. at 1904,
[Vol. 57,
1969]
reversed for the same reason; in this instance the officer only
witnessed the defendant talking to persons known to be dope addicts.
The Court held that this did not warrant stopping and frisking the
defendant.24
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 2.01-.02 seems
to follow the New York law. It states:
2.02(2): A policeman may stop a person if that person is observed
in circumstances which suggest that he has committed or is about to
commit a felony or misdemeanor.
2.02(5): If there is reasonable belief that the policemen's safety so re-
quires it, he may frisk the suspect.
25
The Uniform Arrest Act26 provides for a new category of detention in
the course of investigation which is not an arrest. The detention is
just a "street stop" which may occur at any place and at any time in
order for the officer to make a superficial investigation of the suspect.
This detention may be for a lengthy period of time as under New
York law and may even include removal from the place of appre-
hension. In contrast, the Model Code permits a maximum investigation
of only twenty minutes on the spot of the detention. 27
Are the stop and frisk laws an answer to a historical problem or
are they just one more step on the road to a police-state? Viewpoints
will differ depending upon an individual's personal feeling, but the
inevitable pro and con dichotomy is already evident. The forces against
the enactment, judicial or legislative, cite as the basis of their argument
the law of torts where arrest is used to refer to any interference with
the liberty of a person, no matter how slight.28 Using this as a spring-
board one must then turn to the fourth amendment to find the standard
to be applied. There is found the "probable cause" requirement which
effectively destroys the rationale behind the stop and frisk law.29
Those opposed to stop and frisk laws further state that such laws will
24 Id. at 1902.
2 5 MODEL CODE OF PRE-AMRRGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft no. 1, 1966)
[Hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
20 UmFOmi ARPMT Acr § 2(3) (1967).
27Note, Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CORNELrL L. REv. 899, 910
(1968).
28 W. PnossE, HANDD~ooE OF ± LAW OF ToRTs § 12 (3d. ed. 1964).
29 The stop and frisk law must be narrowly construed to preserve its con-
stitutionality. The stop, if it is a simple inquiry about the suspects actions,
probably is permissible. But, if any actual restraint or detention occurs, it must be
based on probable cause. Futhermore, regardless of semantic gymnastics, a frisk is
a search and also must meet the standard of probable cause. Schoenfield, The
"Stop and Frisk" Law is Unconstitutional, 17 SYnAcusE L. REv. 627 (1967).
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cause increased tensions between police and citizens, especially those
of minority groups. Many leaders of these groups have already ex-
pressed their concern that the stop and frisk laws will be applied
unequally to members of minority groups whose habits, dress, or
environment make them appear more suspicious to the patrolmen.30
Admittedly this law places a considerable amount of coercive pressure
in the hands of the local patrolman who walks the beat.31 The pro-
ponents of stop and frisk do not see the problem this way. They feel
the laws will remove the necessity of actually arresting a person if
he appears suspicious. Clearly any increased activity by the police
unaccompanied by an increase in public relations efforts will serve
to antagonize minority groups.
Historically the police have been able to stop and question a
suspicious person.32 This has been an English common law provision
that has been carried up to the present, and there does not appear to
have been any ill effects flowing from the practice. Countering the
arguments of the constitutionalists, the basis of the stop and frisk law
is reasonable suspicion, which is, by definition, just one step removed
from belief. Realistically the stop is less serious than an arrest and
therefore should require less justification. The purpose of the frisk is
a safety measure and as such is not a "full blown" search; it should
therefore require less justification than does the search. The purported
benefits from giving the police the power to stop rather than arrest
can be summarized as follows: 1) avoiding a dilution of the probable
30 Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search, 57 J. Cnm~. L.C. & P.S. 251,
256 (1966).
31 If the choice, then, is between permitting the legislature to promulgate
what is in effect a new standard to govern search and seizure or accepting
the possibility that some courts, in an attempt to preserve the admis-
sibility of seized evidence, will strain to find probable cause in situations
where its existence is questionable, the latter seems preferable. Re-
taining the present standard of probable cause will limit the extension
of police power to those situations in which probable cause originally
exists, whereas a new standard of 'reasonable suspicion' would expand
police authority to cover a multitude of new situations. Moreover,
forcing police to conform to the present standard will encourage im-
provement in methods of investigation, the only real solution to the
problem. Note, Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 899
(1968).
32 The Statute of Winchester drawn up in 1285 stated:
... [F]rom the day of Ascension unto the Day of St. Michael [Watch-
man] shall watch the Town continually all Night, from Sunsetting
Unto Sunsetting Unto Sunrising. And if any Stranger do pass by them he
shall be arrested until Morning; and if no suspicion be found, he shall
go quiet; and if they find suspicion they shall forthwith deliver him
to the sheriff. . . . 13 Edw. 1, Stat. Wynton, ch. 4 (1285) [cited in 1
DAwsoN's STATUTES OF THE REALM 97 (1963)].
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cause requirement in arrest cases; 2) avoiding the necessity of making
an arrest; 3) allowing an opportunity for exculpation; and 4) reducing
police lawlessness and frustration. The special benefits to be achieved
from the frisk are: 1) reducing danger to policemen, and 2) pre-
venting crime by confiscating knives, guns, and other weapons. 33
If the Kentucky legislature sees fit to pass a stop and frisk law, it
is recommended that the best points of the New York law be combined
with the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure and the best
common law provisions found in other jurisdictions. The following
proposed statute is the result of just such a combination:
(1) A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place
whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed,
or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor and may de-
mand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his
actions.34
(2) When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning
pursuant to this section and the officer reasonably believes his
safety so requires, he may frisk the suspect,35 strictly limiting
the frisk to a superficial patting down of the suspects outer
garments in search of dangerous weapons.
This writer believes that the suggested statute would be constitu-
tionally acceptable, as the various components have already been
tested by the Supreme Court and found not to be in contravention of
the guarantees afforded by the fourth amendment. If it is enacted
and if the various local enforcement agencies carry on an intense
public relations campaign, the statute may serve to eliminate, not
cause, tension presently existing between the citizens and police.
Charles D. Weaver, Jr.
Ci ui AL LAW-CoMMERCIAL BamERY-T-E NxED FOR LEISiLAVE
REFonrw.-The national economy has exploded by phenomenal pro-
portions in recent years. Big business and its allies are pushing national
and local economies to pinnacles of success never before experienced.
Speculating as to the cause, one will eventually give partial credit to a
nationally competitive life style which envisions material gain as the
33 Swartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CmmU. L.P. & P.S. 433 (1967).34 N.Y. CODE CIm. PRoc. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1966).3 5 MODEL CODE § 2.02(5).
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